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INTRODUCTION
Customary international law is puzzling in a way treaties are
untroubling. Treaties are contracts, and the source of the obligations
they impose on states, as well their content, present no special legal
problem.1 If there is a puzzle about how treaties can bind states, it
is a general puzzle about how contracts can legally bind promisors.
By comparison, the status of customary international law is con-
troversial.2 Customary international law is law that “results from
a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation.”3 Because it is created by the regular prac-
tice of states, the extent of behavioral regularity required for a
custom to exist is vague. Similarly, because customary international
law does not have the canonical form of a treaty or statute, its
content is uncertain. Even the extent to which states act merely in
accordance with norms, rather than from a sense of obligation, is
unknown and understudied.4 
Customary international law has to answer a range of questions.
May a state unilaterally withdraw from a treaty to which it is a
party when the treaty does not otherwise provide for withdrawal?5
Are states obligated to not arbitrarily detain people or subject them
to degrading treatment?6 May a successor state repudiate the odious
1. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83
(2005).
2. See id. at 23-24.
3. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987); cf. Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law,
272 RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 188 (1998) (explaining that a rule of customary international law
is one that emerges from, and is sustained by, constant and uniform state practice “in
circumstances which give rise to a legitimate expectation of similar conduct in the future”).
4. For different assessments of the causal role of customary international law, see
generally GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1; ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW
WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008); George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The
Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541 (2005). 
5. See Nathan  Feinberg, Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization, 39
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 189, 216 (1963) (arguing presumption in favor of unilateral termination of
treaties).
6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702
(discussing arbitrary detention and degrading treatment).
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debts of the preceding state?7 Because customary international law
is created by the regular practice among states, not by the states’
lawmakers,8 its legal validity is not self-evident. Three questions
can therefore be asked in connection with its legal status: (1) What
are the norms of customary international law governing the conduct
of states and their citizens?; (2) Are states legally bound by cus-
tomary international law?; and (3) Does customary international
law apply domestically without incorporation by domestic law? 
I will argue that there are other sorts of questions that do not
need to be asked about customary international law—namely, juris-
prudential ones. It is often thought that judicial recognition of cus-
tomary international law depends on jurisprudential assumptions
about the nature of law, legal norms, and legal validity.9 This is a
mistake. The limits of judicial reliance on customary intern-
ational law are constitutional or evidentiary, not jurisprudential.10
Jurisprudential views about law, which are analytic in character,
have nothing to say about the questions posed above. 
My argument follows in three steps. The first step is a claim
about Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.11 Although Erie can fairly be
read to require domestic authorization in order for customary
international law to have domestic legal effect, the case and its
reasoning do not rely on commitments to a theory of law, including
legal positivism. Second, reliance on positivism has an unwelcome
consequence for the binding character of customary international
law. Third, conceptions of law or legal validity can ground different
views about the relation between international and domestic law.
Positions on the priority of customary international law are there-
fore determined by views about that relation, not by views on the
7. James V. Feinerman, Odious Debt, Old and New: The Legal Intellectual History of an
Idea, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 193 (questioning the existence of a norm
permitting repudiation of odious debts).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2).
9. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734-36 (2004) (citing The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)); Igartua v. United States, 626 F.3d 592, 602 (1st Cir. 2010);
Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1144 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
10. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 23-24 (evidentiary issues); Saikrishna
Prakash, The Constitutional Status of Customary International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 65, 66 (2006) (constitutional issues).
11. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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source of its authority. Taken together, these considerations suggest
that jurisprudence is not needed to answer the questions courts and
other legal authorities ask about customary international law’s
content, the legal obligations it creates, and its domestic legal effect.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I argues that legal
positivism is irrelevant to Erie’s holding that federal jurisdiction
does not give federal courts general law-making power. Positivism
is neither sufficient nor necessary for Erie’s result and rationale.
Instead, the holding rests on one or more uncertain constitutional
bases. Part II describes a dilemma for those relying on legal posi-
tivism as a basis for Erie’s result: dualists about international law
must either conclude that customary international law does not
bind governments or select a conception of positivism that preserves
customary international law but is ad hoc. The domestic effect of
customary international law concerns the relative priorities a legal
system places on domestic and international law. Part III argues
that the same conception of law can ground different views about
that priority. It concludes that positions on customary international
law are determined by substantive legal views about the proper
relation between international and domestic law, not by the source
of authority of customary international law. Part IV briefly argues,
based on the conclusions in Parts I-III, that legal arguments about
customary international law are unaffected by conceptual questions
about the nature of law, legal authority, or the identity of a legal
system. 
I. POSITIVISM AS DICTA 
The requirement that customary international law must have
domestic authorization to have domestic legal effect derives from
Erie. According to Erie, federal courts have no power to make com-
mon law “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by the Acts of Congress.”12 Absent constitutional or congressional
authorization to make law, a federal court must apply state law as
decided by the state’s highest court.13 Erie’s requirement of federal
or state authorization is frequently thought to depend on legal
12. Id. at 78.
13. Id.
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positivism.14 As a result, the domestic status of customary interna-
tional law is also thought to rely on the same view about the nature
of law. Customary international law is a regularity in behavior
among states acting from a “sense of legal obligation.”15 Because
Erie requires a legal rule to have an authoritative federal or state
source, customary international law has no domestic application
unless it is authorized by federal or state law. 
Legal positivism is a view about the nature of law.16 It is a claim
about what makes a norm a legal norm and makes it part of a legal
system.17 In its most general form, positivism holds that law
consists of social facts of a particular sort.18 Versions of positivism
differ according to the social facts on which law depends, as well as
how these facts explain law.19 The classic form of the theory is that
a state’s law consists only of what its legal officials declare as
binding.20 In John Austin’s version of legal positivism, law consists
of the coercive orders of the sovereign and its agents.21 This is the
version that Holmes asserted in his dissent in Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.
and that Brandeis approvingly recited in Erie.22 Positivism, if inde-
pendent of Erie’s holding, is superfluous to Erie and therefore also
14. See, e.g., William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional
Revolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907, 907-08 (1988); Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110:
An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1789-95 (1997); Louise
Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1057, 1060-61 (2013); cf. TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT
AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 101 (1981) (noting that “Erie reflected
jurisprudential assumptions” of the period). For an example of judicial support for the claimed
reliance, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101 (1945) (“[Erie] overruled a
particular way of looking at law.”).
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987).
16. Jack Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA.
L. REV. 673, 677 (1998).
17. Id.
18. See id. at 679; see also JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE
OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 120 (2001); Jules L. Coleman, Negative and
Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 139 (1982). 
19. Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 16, at 678.
20. See id. at 679.
21. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 18-19 (Wilfrid E.
Rumble ed., 1995).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 23-27.
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to the domestic status of customary international law. It is inde-
pendent of the holding if positivism is neither sufficient nor neces-
sary for the holding. 
It is understandable that Erie might be thought to rely on legal
positivism. The opinion itself almost says as much. After basing the
limitation on a federal court’s power to make general common law
on statutory construction and policy, Justice Brandeis came to the
constitutional objection to the power.23 The “fallacy” underlying the
view that federal courts have general common law-making power,
he said, is the assumption of a wrong theory of law.24 Quoting
approvingly Justice Holmes’s dissent in Black & White Taxicab,
Brandeis identified the assumption as the belief that there is “a
transcendental body of law outside any particular State but oblig-
atory within it unless and until changed by statute.”25 The correct
theory of law instead is one which holds that “law in the sense in
which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite
authority behind it.”26 This is Holmes’s then-unexceptional version
of legal positivism. The closeness in proximity in the opinion be-
tween this observation and the constitutional objection makes it
appear that the objection has a partly jurisprudential basis. In fact,
it does not. Positivism is a superfluous premise in Erie’s rationale
and its constitutional holding.27 
Positivism is insufficient for Erie’s holding. Assume that positiv-
ism is true. It follows that all legally valid norms must have a
federal or state source of authority. Erie’s holding limiting federal
judicial law-making power could still be wrong because legal posi-
tivism’s truth is consistent with a variety of different constitutional
roles for federal courts. Article III’s grant of diversity jurisdiction
might authorize federal courts to make independent judgments
about state law. Admiralty jurisdiction is understood to give law-
23. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”).
24. Id. at 79.
25. Id. at 64 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
26. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
27. For a slightly different version of the relationship between Erie and positivism, see
Goldsmith & Walt, supra note 16; Steven Walt, Before the Jurisprudential Turn: Corbin and
the Mid-Century Opposition to Erie, 2 WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE REV. 75 (2010).
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making authority,28 and diversity jurisdiction might do the same.
Alternatively, Article III might give federal courts authority to
create general federal common law: a national common law based
on the same sources of law as state common law but that is neither
state law nor federal law for Article VI’s purposes. Different courts
understood Swift v. Tyson’s recognition of the judicial power to
make general federal law in a diversity case in different ways.29 If
they were wrong, their error was in the interpretation of Article III,
not because their interpretation was inconsistent with legal posi-
tivism. As far as positivism goes, Article III could authorize a
general federal law-making power. Thus, positivism by itself does
not assign any particular law-making role to federal courts. It is
implausible to think otherwise, and those who think that Erie and
positivism are connected in some way do not likely believe that
positivism is sufficient for Erie’s holding.
More likely, positivism in combination with constitutional limi-
tations restricts a federal court’s law-making authority. Although
positivism by itself is insufficient for Erie’s holding, positivism
together with these limitations might be regarded as sufficient.
After all, Justice Brandeis’s opinion invokes both positivism and
constitutional considerations.30 However, the trouble with this view
is that positivism figures as a superfluous premise in the reasoning
supporting Erie’s conclusion. Although the constitutional basis of
the opinion is opaque, Justice Brandeis likely relied on the Tenth
Amendment to find constitutional limitations on the federal gov-
ernment’s powers. Because the Tenth Amendment, according to the
opinion, limits Congress’s power to declare substantive rules of
common law,31 it also limits the power of federal courts to do the
same.32 As a result, federal courts lack the power to make general
28. Ernest A. Young, It’s Just Water: Toward the Normalization of Admiralty, 35 J. MAR.
L. & COM. 469, 469 (2004).
29. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
30. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79.
31. Cf. id. at 78 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State.”). The text identifies federalism as a possible constitutional limitation
on federal judicial law making. See id. There are other well-known possible constitutional
bases, including separation of powers or other structural limitations. The basis identified in
the text serves only to illustrate the role of constitutional limitations in Erie’s result. For this
purpose, any possible constitutional limitation on federal judicial law making suffices. 
32. See id. at 80 (“We merely declare that in applying the doctrine [of Swift] this Court
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federal common law. Here, the Tenth Amendment and an inferred
limitation on federal courts restrict the federal judicial authority.
They alone justify Erie’s holding. Positivism, even if true, plays no
role in limiting the judicial power to make general common law. As
a theory of law, positivism asserts a necessary truth about law. If
true, it holds for all logically, or sociologically, possible legal sys-
tems. However, the constitutional limitation on federal judicial law
making does not rely on positivism’s necessary truth any more than
it relies on any other necessary truth, such as “2 + 2 = 4” or
“bachelors are unmarried males.” If the justification for Erie’s result
included the statement “2 + 2 = 4,” the statement would easily be
understood as irrelevant to the justification. In exactly the same
way, positivism is irrelevant to the justification for the limitation on
the authority of federal courts to make common law. It might be
true, but its truth has nothing to do with Erie’s justification.
Positivism is also unnecessary to Erie’s result. To see this, notice
again that positivism is a theory of law: a view about the conditions
that norms must satisfy in order to be legal norms.33 Positivism
maintains that social facts necessarily determine the legal status of
norms.34 Suppose, however, moral facts, not social facts, necessarily
determine their legal status. In this case, positivism is false. For
instance, a natural law theory might require norms to be consistent
with natural law, morality, or reason to be law.35 Although such a
and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the
Constitution to the several States.”).
33. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18.
34. Formulations of positivism distinguish exclusive positivism from inclusive positivism.
Exclusive positivism maintains that the existence and content of legal rules are determined
solely (“exclusively”) by social facts such as relevant social practices. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO,
LEGALITY 274-76 (2011); see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 47-48 (2d ed. 2009).
Inclusive positivism holds that the social facts that determine law can include the acceptance
of moral criteria. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 107-09; W.J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE
LEGAL POSITIVISM 81-82 (1994). When morality is accepted as a criterion of legality, the
existence and content of legal rules are determined by morality. COLEMAN, supra note 18, at
110-11. In this case law is not determined solely by social facts. The statement in the text
describes both exclusive and inclusive positivism. Nothing in the arguments below concerning
positivism turns on favoring one version of positivism over the other. 
35. See DERYCK BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, LAW AS A MORAL JUDGMENT 11-18
(1986). For natural law theories that do not make morality a condition of legality, see JOHN
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 25-29 (2d ed. 2011); MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL
LAW IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICS 8-20 (2006).
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view is a storybook version of such theories, it is a coherent view.
Nonetheless, Erie’s limitation on federal judicial law making could
still apply in a legal system whose norms have the required moral
content. In this system, a federal court would need authority to
create norms, even when they are consistent with morality. Thus,
even if positivism is false, Erie’s limitation on judicial law making
could still apply. Positivism therefore is not necessary for Erie’s
result because Erie’s holding is narrow. It is limited to the con-
straints that the U.S. Constitution imposes on the power of federal
courts.36 Because these constraints are constitutional and peculiar
to a particular legal system, they do not apply to other legal systems
in which the same constitutional constraints do not operate. Erie’s
requirement that law have an authoritative source in federal or
state law is a requirement in a particular legal system with par-
ticular constitutional constraints. Thus, Erie’s holding depends only
on constitutional allocations of law-making authority in this legal
system. By contrast, legal positivism is a theory of law: a view about
the conditions that hold for legal norms in all logically or perhaps
socially possible legal systems. Because constitutional provisions
can vary across legal systems, positivism might be false although
Erie’s holding remains correct. 
An example illustrates this possibility. Suppose the conflict-of-law
rules applied by a federal court sitting in diversity select the law of
a jurisdiction that makes natural law or reason controlling.
Suppose, too, that, as a matter of the jurisdiction’s constitution,
interpretation by the jurisdiction’s highest court is not declarative
of the norm’s content. Courts in the selected jurisdiction themselves
are not bound by a superior court’s interpretation of the controlling
norm.37 According to Erie, the same holds for the federal court.38 The
36. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79.
37. The case of Louisiana makes for an interesting study. Its courts are bound by the
decisions of higher courts, at least in the sense that their decisions are appealable to superior
courts. See Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1147
n.155 (2011). However, the decisions of higher courts may or may not be binding authority for
them. Id. The reversibility of a lower court decision does not by itself show that state law
considers the reversing court’s interpretation of law authoritative. For a different observation
that convergence among different jurisdictions, although not authoritative, can be evidence
of what domestic law requires, see Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius
Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129 (2005). Convergence also can sometimes be bad evidence. 
38. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-79.
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court is not bound by the pronouncements of lawmakers in the
selected jurisdiction as to the controlling norm’s construction. It
need not defer to the jurisdiction’s highest court’s view of what
natural law or reason requires. For federal constitutional reasons,
the federal court has no authority to make law on a basis other than
natural law or reason. 
Holmes would agree. In his dissent in Black & White Taxicab,
which Brandeis relied on in Erie, Holmes stated: 
If a state constitution should declare that on all matters of
general law the decisions of the highest Court should establish
the law until modified by statute or by a later decision of the
same Court, I do not perceive how it would be possible for a
Court of the United States to refuse to follow what the State
Court decided in that domain.39 
Holmes made it clear that the basis of federal court deference to
state courts is state constitutional law: state constitutional provi-
sions deem state supreme court decisions declarative of state law.
The implication of Holmes’s statement is the converse proposition
in that if a state’s constitution, expressly or by implication,40 does
not consider decisions by the state supreme court declarative of
state law, a federal court is not bound by the declarations of that
court as to state law. The jurisdiction’s law in the example above
does not contain a constitutional provision of the sort required to
bind federal courts. Thus, the interpretation of the norm of natural
reason by that jurisdiction’s highest court is not authoritative of
what natural law requires. 
It might be objected that the example does not embarrass posi-
tivism because the possibility assumes that there is a judicial
practice among courts in the reference jurisdiction: the practice of
39. 276 U.S. 518, 534 (1928); see Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Sir Frederick
Pollock (Feb. 17, 1928), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 214, 215 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
1941) (“The question of what is the law of Massachusetts or of Louisiana is a matter that
Mass. or La. has a right to determine for itself, and that being so, the voice of the state should
be obeyed as well when it speaks through its Supreme Court as it would be if it spoke through
its Legislature.”).
40. See infra text accompanying note 44. For discussion of the constitutional basis of
Holmes’s views about the distribution of law making between federal and state courts, see
Walt, supra note 27, at 80-88. 
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making independent judgments about what natural law or reason
requires. However, the objection fails. If a judicial practice is enough
to authorize law making, Swift would be consistent with positivism,
a theory that Brandeis rejected. The Supreme Court in Swift, and
lower courts before Swift, recognized the authority of federal courts
to make general federal common law.41 Rather, constitutional limits
based on the Tenth Amendment or structural constraints of fed-
eralism limited this authority.42 For the same reason, constitutional
considerations require the federal court to apply the norm of natural
law or reason. Positivism’s truth has nothing to do with this re-
quirement. Put another way, if law must have an authoritative
source, it is because constitutional considerations require it, not the
other way around. 
It follows, then, that the demand that federal courts respect state
law is a federal constitutional constraint. Federal common law-
making power is therefore limited by the authority states give to
their courts to determine state law. State constitutions, in turn,
determine whether state judicial decisions make state law.43 It is
hard to know whether states’ constitutions give their courts law-
making authority rather than just the power to decide cases
according to state law. State constitutions do not expressly deal with
the matter, and the drafters of state constitutions probably did not
think that courts make law. Thus, the law-making authority of state
courts must be determined by a default rule of interpretation.
Holmes offered one such rule in his dissent in Black & White
Taxicab. By creating a state supreme court, the state constitution
implicitly authorizes the court to make decisions declarative of state
law: “[W]hen the constitution of a State establishes a Supreme
Court it by implication does make that declaration [that is, that the
decisions of the Court establish state law] as clearly as if it had said
it in express words.”44 
41. See William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1521-27 (1984). 
42. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
43. Compare ALA. CONST. art. III, § 43 (prohibiting courts from encroaching on legislative
power), with MONT. CONST. art. III, § 1 (allowing the judicial branch to sometimes serve a
legislative function).
44. Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 534 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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This possibility presents a poor default rule of interpretation for
inferring state judicial law-making authority. For one thing, it is
probably historically inaccurate. A few states originally had more
than one highest court.45 The drafters of state constitutions at the
time were familiar with a range of state judicial systems that
included both hierarchical and nonhierarchical structures.46 They
would not likely have risked having several highest courts create
inconsistent state law.47 In addition, the drafters of state constitu-
tions probably thought that state legislatures made law; courts only
discerned the rules of decision needed to decide cases. They likely
did not believe that courts create rules of decision to promote social
policy or other ends they favor. After all, the drafters were not early
working legal realists. For both reasons, the creation of a single
“supreme” court in a state does not signal an intent to delegate the
authority to create state law to the court. Finally, even if a state
constitution gives the supreme court law-making power by implica-
tion, that authority is created by a state constitutional provision,
not by a theory of law. 
Erie’s logic does not require a commitment to positivism. Whether
positivism somehow predisposed or otherwise influenced the accept-
ance of Erie’s holding is a different question—a historical question
about the causal influence of subscribing to a particular conception
of law. Causation is supported by instances in which, other things
being equal, nonpositivists dispute Erie’s holding. Ideally, an exper-
iment could be designed to settle the question.48 In the experiment,
45. For example, North Carolina’s Constitution of 1776 created three tribunals with no
hierarchy among them: the Supreme Court of Law, the Supreme Court of Equity, and the
Judges of Admiralty. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, §§ XIII, XXI, XXIX. New York’s Constitution
of 1777 created a “supreme” court but gave it no appellate jurisdiction over the chancellor,
probate courts, or admiralty. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. III, XXIV, XXV, XXVII. Texas has two
highest courts: the Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals. TEX. CONST. art. V,
§§ II, III, V. For other states with more than one high court, see David E. Engdahl, What’s in
a Name? The Constitutionality of Multiple “Supreme” Courts, 66 IND. L.J. 457, 470-71 (1991). 
46. See Engdahl, supra note 45, at 473.
47. See id.
48. Experimental evidence also would be helpful in deciding whether there is, as
sometimes claimed, a causal connection between a conception of law and adjudication. For
opposing views on the causal impact of conceptions of law on adjudication, compare  H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 210-12 (2d ed. 1994), and Liam Murphy, The Political Question
of the Concept of Law, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF
LAW 371, 395 & n.91 (Jules Coleman ed., 2001), with DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN
WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS 32-33 (2d ed. 2010), Robert Alexy, A Defense of Radbruch’s Formula,
2013] WHY JURISPRUDENCE DOESN’T MATTER 1035
legal observers could be randomly assigned to treatment and control
groups. Those in the treatment groups could be divided into two
subgroups: a group instructed in nonpositivist theories of law and
a group instructed in positivism. The average frequency with which
members of each group come to accept Erie’s holding would measure
the causal impact of jurisprudential theories on belief in the
holding. Obviously, this randomized experiment is infeasible, and
the causal inference it supports is unavailable. The evidence sup-
porting a causal inference instead must be determined through
indirect and historical means. 
Although the causal impact of beliefs about positivism is an
empirical matter, the evidence available does not suggest a causal
connection. Brandeis’s opinion reflects his view that positivism
limits the authority of federal courts to create federal law,49 and
Holmes’s dissent in Black & White Taxicab suggests that he would
have agreed.50 Brandeis’s and Holmes’s endorsements of positivism
likely were not idiosyncratic; legal academics and the influential
treatises of the period expressed the same view.51 But a believer in
a nonpositivist theory of law could subscribe to the result in Erie
too. He might be convinced by the constitutional limits on the law-
making authority of federal courts in diversity cases. Or he might
prefer more progressive state common law and believe that state
court judges are more likely than federal judges to produce progres-
sive state common law.52 Or the nonpositivist might believe that the
risk of local prejudice no longer justifies independent federal rules
of decision.53 For this reason, whatever influence positivism has on
in RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW 15, 30-32 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999), and Lon L. Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 648-61
(1958).
49. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
50. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
51. See A.V. DICEY, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND WITH REFERENCE TO THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 13-14 (1896); NEIL DUXBURY, FREDERICK POLLOCK AND THE ENGLISH JURISTIC
TRADITION 101 (2004); THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 43-54 (13th
ed. 1924); W.L. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN 160-70 (1982). 
52. Cf. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE,
THE JUDICIAL POWER AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
AMERICA 134-35 (2000) (discussing Brandeis’s belief in the integrity of local law). 
53. Cf. FREYER, supra note 14, at 146 (noting a perceived reduction in local uncertainty
and prejudice).
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the belief in Erie’s result can come from factors unrelated to views
about the nature of law.54
II. SHIFTING THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY
Committing Erie to positivism not only misunderstands the case’s
holding and rationale; it also has an unwelcome consequence for
customary international law: either customary international law is
not binding on governments, or the conception of positivism that
makes it binding on them is arbitrarily selected. Erie’s commitment
to positivism means that federal and state law must be the result of
what law-making officials declare to be the law.55 According to the
classical version of positivism, law consists of the coercive orders
issued by a sovereign.56 If customary international law requires the
same authority, it is not binding on governments and therefore is
not law.57 Alternatively, if customary international law binds them,
a different notion of legal authority and law must apply to obligate
governments than those that apply at the domestic level. In this
case, the notions of authority and law appear ad hoc, selected to
preserve the obligatory nature of customary international law.
Prevalent international state practices either do not bind states or
54. Judge John Parker’s position came close to this possibility. Parker viewed Erie as
relying on the wrong conception of law. See John J. Parker, Erie v. Tompkins in Retrospect:
An Analysis of Its Proper Area and Limits, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1949, at 19, 21-22, 83. He was a
nonpositivist who conceived of the common law as consisting of custom and practice, not
judicial decisions. See id. at 20. Judicial decisions, he thought, were evidence of the applicable
rule of decision, but they do not constitute the rule. See id. at 19 (noting that the “change
effected [by Erie] has been neither very great nor very important”). At the same time, Parker
eventually came to the conclusion that Erie did no harm. In his view, the United States had
fairly uniform common law in the period between Swift and Erie; state and federal courts
applied similarly uniform rules. Id. Erie did not materially reinforce diversity in state law,
according to Parker, by preventing federal courts from applying a rule of decision that
predominated among the states. See id. at 21-22, 83. As a result, Parker’s initial policy
grounds for opposing Erie eventually disappeared. See id. at 19, 86; cf. Hewlett v. Schadel, 68
F.2d 502, 504-05 (4th Cir. 1934) (explaining his justification of the Erie doctrine). Although
Parker thought that Erie was wrongly decided, he concluded that the case made no practical
difference in most cases and its correctness was chiefly a “matter of history or legal theory.”
Parker, supra, at 19.
55. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938).
56. HOLLAND, supra note 51, at 49.
57. Id.
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bind them based on an arbitrarily selected conception of law. Both
alternatives are unacceptable, as described in the Sections below.
A. Erie’s Conception of Positivism
Neither Erie’s holding nor its reasoning has anything to do with
a theory of law, as Part I argues. However, Brandeis invoked posi-
tivism in the course of the opinion, relying on the conception stated
in Holmes’s dissent in Black & White Taxicab.58 Holmes’s concep-
tion, shared by John Austin,59 was the classical version of positiv-
ism, according to which laws are the orders of a sovereign backed by
force.60 Law, for Holmes, is the “articulate voice of some sovereign
or quasi-sovereign that can be identified.”61 Neither Holmes nor
Brandeis seemed inclined to qualify or amend this account of law.
Neither had any need to do so, as Austin’s version suited their pur-
poses.62 Because general federal law is common law, the authority
to create it must have a sovereign source in either constitutional or
congressional provisions. Finding no constitutional or congressional
authority, Holmes and Brandeis concluded that no general federal
common law exists.63 The fact that it also has no source in other
sorts of social practices is superfluous and anachronistic. 
The same reasoning would conclude that governments are not
bound by customary international law. Because nations are sover-
eigns not subject to coercive orders of others nations, they are
sovereign with respect to each other. Thus, rules between nations
based on state practice cannot have the status of law. They there-
fore cannot create legal obligations for governments. For classical
positivists who drew this conclusion, customary international law,
58. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79.
59. AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 123-24.
60. See supra text accompanying note 56; see also S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222
(1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting), superceded by statute, Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251.
61. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 221 (“The only authority
available is the common law or statutes of a State.”); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S.
349, 372 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“But [law] does issue ... from the state courts as well
as from the state legislatures. When we know what the source of the law has said that it shall
be, our authority is at an end.”).
62. See AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 123-24.
63. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78, 79; Jensen, 244 U.S. at 222 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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strictly speaking, was a misnomer.64 Although these rules demand
the compliance of nations, the rules do not count as law. They have
no legal status because they are not backed by effective sanctions.
A nation might resolve to comply with customary international law,
but absent rules of state behavior backed by sanctions for noncom-
pliance, these rules lack a sovereign source and are therefore not
law.65 Domestic law might incorporate customary international law
so that its requirements are given effect by being enforced domesti-
cally. In this case, the requirements become law for those subject to
them. However, they do not bind the government. In Thomas
Hollands’s words, the law of nations is the “vanishing point of
Jurisprudence.”66
In passing, classical positivists complain about the vagueness of
the content of customary international law and the diffuse character
of the demand for compliance among nations.67 The basis of their
objection, however, is the source of customary international law. Its
norms are not those of a sovereign to which sanctions for noncompli-
ance are attached. The norms are unaccompanied by sovereign coer-
cion. The behavioral regularity among a diffuse group of nations,
without sovereignty over other nations, will likely produce vague
demands for state compliance. But the lack of sovereign coercion,
not the vagueness of the demands, makes customary international
law “improperly so called.”68
For an international law dualist, positivism presents a problem.
Dualism about customary international law distinguishes custom-
64. See AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 123-24; JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 296 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970);
HOLLAND, supra note 51, at 43.
65. See Roberto Ago, Positive Law and International Law, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 691, 698
(1957). For the influence of classical positivism on the development of the laws of war, see
STEPHEN C. NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 167-201 (2005). Neff’s account draws on
voluntarist elements of contract law held by nineteenth century positivists. Id.
66. HOLLAND, supra note 51, at 391-92.
67. AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 171 (noting the diffuse character of both positive morality
and the law of nations’ demand for compliance); cf. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of
International Law, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 537, 540 (John Bowring ed., 1962)
(proposing codification of unwritten established custom as a means of preventing war).
68. AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 123-24, 171; see 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON
JURISPRUDENCE 567 (Robert Campbell ed., 4th ed. 1879) (“Much of the positive law in any
community is Custom turned into Law by the adjection of the legal sanction.... But the
Sovereign makes it law, not by the mere description, but by the sanction with which he
clothes it.”). 
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ary international law from domestic law.69 Customary international
law and domestic law are parts of distinct legal systems, so cus-
tomary international law is not self-executing.70 It becomes part of
domestic law only by implementing legislation or otherwise incor-
porating it into domestic law.71 The problem lies with its status as
international law binding on the government. If the classical
conception of positivism underlies Erie’s holding, the same concep-
tion must apply to both domestic and international law. Applied
outwardly to international law, however, customary international
law loses its status as law because nations, as independent sover-
eigns, are not subject to the coercive orders of other nations.72 The
rules reflected in regular state behavior that comprise customary in-
ternational law do not have coercive sanctions attached to noncom-
pliance.73 They are not coercive orders issued by nations over the
potentially noncompliant nation.74 Thus, customary international
law is law “improperly so called” even at the national level.75 Its
demands do not legally bind governments outwardly in its relations
with other governments. Dualists must find this consequence
unacceptable because they assume that customary international law
binds governments.76 
B. Mixed Conceptions of Positivism 
To avoid the conclusion that customary international law is law
“improperly so called,” a different version of positivism applicable at
the international level might be adopted. Section A argued that if
Erie’s holding relies on classical positivism and customary interna-
tional law’s legal status depends on the same conception of law,
customary international law does not even bind the federal govern-
ment in its relations with other nations. The intermediate step in
that argument might be denied. That is, one could maintain that a
69. See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 328-29, 333 (Max Knight trans., 1967).
70. Id.
71. Id.; J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law, 17 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 66, 67, 70 (1936).
72. See supra text accompanying note 21.
73. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
74. Cf. AUSTIN, supra note 21, at 123-24, 171.
75. Id. at 123-24.
76. Starke, supra note 71, at 70.
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different version of positivism underlies customary international
law. Of course, the conception of law supposedly underlying Erie
could differ from that applicable at the national level. In its most
general form, Erie requires constitutional or congressional authority
for a federal court to make common law.77 The same requirement
holds when a federal court incorporates customary international law
as federal common law with domestic effect.78 Different limitations
might apply when customary international law applies to the gov-
ernment, creating obligations to other nations. Accordingly, these
limitations might rely on a version of positivism different from
classical positivism. 
1. Hart’s Practice Version
The version of positivism needed to leave customary international
law binding at the national level finds law in social facts other than
coercive sanctions. Hart’s conventionalist account provides a well-
known version of this type of positivism. According to Hart, law is
social practice of a particular sort; a convergent practice among
officials by which they apply the same conclusive criteria for a norm
to constitute law in the community.79 Hart called the rule that de-
scribes the conclusive criteria officials use the “rule of recognition.”80
The rule specifies how to identify legal norms.81 In everything but
name, it is customary law. The law of the community consists of
both the rule of recognition and the norms that satisfy it. On Hart’s
account, a legal system exists when there is a rule of recognition
and when the underlying valid rules are generally followed by those
subject to them.82 Unlike classical positivism, Hart’s account of
positivism does not recognize coercive orders as the social facts
relevant to law.83 Instead, he focuses on the convergent behavior of
77. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
78. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 816, 852-53 (1997).
79. See HART, supra note 48, at 94-95, 110.
80. Id. at 94.
81. Id. at 94-95, 110.
82. Id. at 100.
83. Compare HOLLAND, supra note 51, at 391 (classical positivism), with HART, supra note
48, at 94-95, 110.
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officials in which officials use the same criteria of validity to test
rules and evaluate other officials’ behavior.84
Hart’s view about the character of the required convergent
practice among officials changed over time. In The Concept of Law,
Hart defined the practice as one of convergent behavior as stated
above.85 The rule of recognition describes the conclusive criteria that
officials frequently use in validating norms and assessing other
officials’ performance.86 Later Hart interpreted the social practice to
involve a convention among officials in which officials coordinate
their behavior with one another.87 
A convention is a narrower social practice than a convergence in
behavior, which does not require interdependent action.88 Officials
might follow the same rules without coordinating their behavior
with the behavior of other officials. This is because a rule can set a
standard of compliance that guides behavior without convention
being the reason officials comply with the rule. Officials can have a
range of reasons for complying with the rule unrelated to the actions
of other officials. They can follow the same rules without condition-
ing their action on the behavior of others. Behavior in common need
not be the result of coordination. In identifying law with a social
convention, Hart unnecessarily limited his account and left unex-
plained some important facts about law.
The details of Hart’s version of positivism are unimportant here.
The only point needed is the claim that law is possible only in cases
involving a convergent social practice among officials in using a
conclusive rule for validating norms as law.89 For this claim to be
true, it is not necessary to determine the character of this practice
—whether the behavior involved in the practice must be conven-
tional or merely convergent. A determination that the practice need
84. HART, supra note 48, at 110.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. H.L.A. HART, Postscript, in THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 48, at 238, 255-56; see
COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 93 (explaining Hart’s view); Kenneth Einar Himma, Inclusive
Legal Positivism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 125,
129-30 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) (same).
88. For criticism of Hart’s rule of recognition as a social convention, see SHAPIRO, supra
note 34, at 108-09; Julie Dickson, Is the Rule of Recognition Really a Conventional Rule?, 27
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 375, 381-82, 402 (2007).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
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not involve commands to which coercive sanctions are attached is
enough. If law consists of social practice among officials of using
certain criteria of validity, along with rules that are valid according
to the criteria generally followed by the population to which they
apply, then legal norms need not be coercive in nature. Thus, Hart’s
account of law, unlike classical positivism, is not dependent on
coercive rules issued by a sovereign.
Hart’s practice version of positivism has obvious difficulty ac-
counting for customary international law. International law is not
a system of norms in which officials and subjects are divided.
Instead, there are only states subject to norms of behavior.
Customary international law is also not a system with even a rule
of recognition because no conclusive criteria exist to validate the
norms that bind nations. The regularity in state practice instead
creates a disparate set of norms of customary international law to
obligate nations. For both reasons, international law does not con-
stitute a central case of a legal system, and its rules are not para-
digms of legal rules. Hart acknowledges this but maintains that
international law is nonetheless a simple system of law that resem-
bles domestic legal systems.90 The resemblance lies in the content
of some of its rules. Simple systems of law have no general standard
of validity. They contain only sets of rules treated as binding, sup-
ported by strong, but diffuse, social pressure for compliance.
International law rules are legal in character if they are accepted as
binding by states, creating pressure for other states to comply. For
Hart, the set of international law rules resembles the rules of
domestic legal systems in that both include morally neutral norms.91
These rules are solutions to pure coordination problems.
In fact, the resemblance counts against some customary interna-
tional law. Rules that are solutions to pure coordination problems
are self-enforcing. Once established, the individual interest of the
parties is not served by deviating from them. Parties, therefore, will
depart from the rules only by mistake or ignorance. For this reason,
social pressure for compliance with purely coordinating rules is
unnecessary. Thus, in legal systems without a rule of recognition,
such rules are not legal norms. Many rules of customary interna-
90. HART, supra note 48, at 227, 234, 236. 
91. Id. at 228-29.
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tional law have moral content, including the rules of war,92 immuni-
ties of ambassadors,93 confiscation of property of foreign citizens of
warring states,94 and state expropriation of private property within
its territory. Such rules do not serve the interests of all states, and
unilateral deviation from them can benefit the deviating state. To
be effective, these rules must be supported by strong international
pressure. However, some customary international law rules are
purely coordinating standards. Examples include the determination
of the middle of inland waterways by their navigation,95 the taxation
of a foreign country’s assets in the host country,96 and the precedent
and protocol accorded foreign representatives.97 These rules lack
strong pressure for compliance because they are self-enforcing.
Without a rule of recognition operating at the international level or
officials to identify the rules as customary international law, the
rules are not part of international law. By contrast, a domestic legal
system’s rule of recognition can count purely coordinating rules
among its rules, even when these coordinating rules are not
enforced.
2. Mixed Conceptions and Their Problems
Suppose that Hart’s practice version of positivism is correct in its
broad outlines. One could believe that Erie relies on a classical ver-
sion of positivism, whereas the practice version validates customary
international law at the international level. Erie requires that the
domestic application of customary international law have a domestic
sovereign source,98 whereas its application to nations might have an
92. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900) (coastal fishing vessels not subject
to capture as war prize).
93. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 349-50, 364-65 (7th ed.
2008) (diplomatic immunities).
94. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428-30 (1964) (disputing
limitations on a state’s power to confiscate property in its territory).
95. See Louisiana v. Mississippi, 516 U.S. 22, 25 (1995); New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S.
361, 379 (1934) (stating the “thalweg” rule).
96. See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 125, 147 (1812); Republic
of Argentina v. City of New York, 50 N.E.2d 698, 704 (N.Y. 1969).
97. See G.F. MARTENS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 226-27 (1802) (protocol of
newly arriving ministers); MONSIEUR DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 460 (J. Chitty ed.,
1858) (“minister” ranks just below ambassador). 
98. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
1044 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1023
international source. This view retains Erie’s supposed commitment
to positivism while also preserving the dualist’s position that
customary international law binds nations. It is a mixed view in
that different conceptions of positivism apply to domestic and
international law. However, the mixed view is ad hoc. It draws on
two different theories of law in order to preserve dualism. To see
this, consider a passage in which Professor Weisburd invoked the
practice conception of positivism at the international level:
[T]he human authority that creates customary international law
is the collective international community. That community
makes law by employing mechanisms as positivistic as those the
states employ. Thus, applying rules developed under the
authority of the international community hardly amounts to
resurrecting the concept of general law. Rather, such an
approach incorporates the insight from Erie, that human agency
creates law, and looks to the appropriate agency to determine a
particular law’s content.99
There are two problems with Weisburd’s position. One is identified
by Professors Bradley and Goldsmith: Erie requires a domestic law
source of authority, state or federal, for a federal court to apply cus-
tomary international law.100 Because the international community
by itself is not such a source, the court cannot rely on customary
international law unless authorized by constitutional or statutory
provisions. 
The second problem is that the conception of positivism invoked
by Weisburd is ad hoc. His position implicitly invokes two different
conceptions of positivism: one applicable internationally and the
other domestically. Recognition of customary international law rules
by nations can constitute law, according to the practice conception
of positivism.101 However, Erie supposedly relies on classical posi-
tivism as a conception of law, which requires a sovereign authority
whose directives are backed by effective sanctions.102 According to
99. A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, 51 (1995).
100. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 78, at 853.
101. HART, supra note 87, at 233-35 (describing and endorsing the view of international law
as a set of customary rules binding on states).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
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Erie, customary international law is not an authoritative source of
law domestically because the international community does not
exercise effective control over domestic matters in the United
States. Its norms are not by themselves domestic authority for fed-
eral courts. Thus, for customary international law rules to have
legal authority both internationally and domestically, they must
satisfy two different conceptions of law: the classical and practice
versions of positivism.
Reliance on different conceptions of law at the domestic and
international levels is arbitrary. A conception of law states condi-
tions of legality that apply to any legal system. Its conditions do not
change at the border. Of course, the same version of positivism could
be applicable both domestically and internationally. However,
classical positivism does not count customary international law
norms as law and therefore considers them not legally binding on
states. This conception of law is inconsistent with international law
dualism, which recognizes that states can be bound by customary
international law.103 More plausible is the practice conception. It can
consider customary international law rules to be law at both the
domestic and international levels, as they might be supported by
state pressure for conformity and satisfy the rule of recognition
operative in a domestic legal system. But reliance on this conception
requires giving up the sort of positivism to which Erie is supposedly
committed. 
There is nothing in itself objectionable about concluding that a
different conception of law underlies Erie’s limitation on federal
judicial law making than the conception apparently relied on in the
case. Brandeis could simply have been wrong about the correct ver-
sion of positivism. However, unlike classical positivism, the practice
version of positivism does not limit the sort of authority acknowl-
edged by the rule of recognition.104 Thus, it does not require that the
103. KELSEN, supra note 69, at 333.
104. HART, supra note 48, at 94 (stating the rule of recognition consists in some feature or
features that conclusively identify primary rules of obligation); id. at 247 (noting that criteria
of legality can include principles of justice, moral values, or pedigree). The practice version
does not by itself require the criteria of legality to have any particular content. Whether it
includes moral principles or values, or nonmoral facts such as enactment in accordance with
a prescribed procedure, depends on the particular social practice among officials. Exclusive
positivism limits criteria of legality to social facts, while inclusive positivists allow it to have
any content. See supra note 34. Although exclusive and inclusive positivism disagree about
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power to make a federal rule of decision be authorized by the
Constitution or a federal statute. A rule of recognition could count
the rule as law even when not authorized by political actors.
Instead, constitutional restrictions alone put these limits on a
federal court’s authority to make law. This again shows that juris-
prudential views about the nature of law are silent in Erie. 
It might be denied that reliance on the Constitution avoids a
commitment to a conception of law. After all, the Constitution itself
might not be legal authority. To know whether it is legal authority,
one has to know what counts as law. Someone might doubt that the
Constitution is law. To eliminate this doubt, it must be shown that
the Constitution can have legal authority. To demonstrate that it
does requires a theory of law—an account of the features that give
norms legal authority.
This denial misunderstands both the dispute in Erie and the
justification of conceptions of law. The issue in Erie is not whether
a constitutional limit on federal judicial law making is author-
itative.105 Both advocates and opponents of the power of federal
courts to create general law agree that this limit would be authori-
tative. They disagree only over whether the Constitution limits this
power when it is not exercised based on congressional or other
political authority. More importantly, the doubt relies on an inap-
propriately high standard of justification. It demands a conclusive
demonstration that the Constitution can be legally authoritative.
The demand sets a higher standard for justification than is required
for justification in other domains, including law. The best evidence
for climate change or evolution does not show, or purport to show,
that it is impossible for atmospheric temperatures or species char-
acteristics to remain unchanged. The demand-and-answer route
eventually leads to a regress or a circle. Eventually, the same
demand to justify a constitutional consideration can be made of
any other consideration, beginning the regress in justification.
the allowable criteria, their dispute concerns the conditions necessary for a social practice. See
COLEMAN, supra note 18, at 108. Roughly, exclusive positivism maintains that the
convergence required for a social practice depends on criteria based only on social facts.
Inclusive positivism denies this. The disagreement therefore is over the conceptual
constraints on a social practice, not over the practice version of positivism.
105. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (“But the unconstitutionality
of the course pursued [that is, by the doctrine of Swift] has now been made clear and compels
us to act.”).
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Alternatively, the authority that justifies a constitutional consider-
ation itself relies on the Constitution, thereby making the justifica-
tion circular. Consistently applied, the demand for a conclusive
demonstration leads to skepticism about reliance on any purported
source of legal authority.
With few additional assumptions, any plausible theory of law
can count the Constitution as a source of law. Reliance on the
Constitution can be among the social facts that determine law (posi-
tivism), and the Constitution’s provisions can be consistent with
morality (natural law). Whether the recourse to the Constitution in
fact is part of a social practice that is the source of law or consistent
with morality is a further question. This is a sociological matter,
dependant on prevailing social practices for positivism, and sub-
stantive morality for natural law.
III. PRIORITY AND SELF-EXECUTING LAW 
A final question about customary international law is whether it
applies domestically without being incorporated by domestic law.
For instance, suppose a contract between state A and state B
includes a particular term and provides that A’s law controls the
agreement. The term is enforceable under state A’s law but invalid
according to customary international law, which A has not incorpo-
rated into its law. Is customary international law self-executing so
that, notwithstanding A’s law, the contract term is invalid? This
conflict is often described as one involving two different ways of
conceiving the relation between domestic and international legal
systems—legal monism and dualism. 
Legal monism is the view that domestic and international law
form a single legal order.106 International law, according to most
monists, has priority over domestic law, so that A’s law includes
customary international law without incorporation.107 Dualism
106. See KELSEN, supra note 69, at 328-29; 1 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, International Law and
the Law of the State, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 151, 152-53 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1970); Hans
Kelsen, Sovereignty and International Law, 48 GEO. L.J. 627, 629 (1960); Catherine
Richmond, Preserving the Identity Crisis: Autonomy, System and Sovereignty in European
Law, 16 LAW & PHIL. 377, 407-11 (1997).
107. See, e.g., Bruno Simma, The Contribution of Alfred Verdoss to the Theory of
International Law, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 33, 44 (1995); Starke, supra note 71, at 75-76.
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views domestic and international legal systems as distinct orders,
so that customary international law is effective domestically only if
incorporated in accordance with domestic law.108 For dualists,
domestic law has priority over international law.109 Monism is
thought to support invalidating the term in A and B’s contract,
whereas dualism allows enforcement of the term.
Describing the disagreement over whether customary interna-
tional law is self-executing in this way makes it seem as if the
disagreement is conceptual in character. Monists and dualists dis-
agree about the requirements necessary for qualification as a valid
legal norm. Monists believe that legally valid rules cannot bind
those subject to them to conflicting requirements, as can occur if
international and domestic legal rules are part of different legal sys-
tems.110 They maintain that consistency in legal directives requires
a single legal order consisting of international and domestic legal
systems.111 For any two rules to be legally valid, both must be part
of the same legal system.112 Dualists allow the possibility that valid
legal rules conflict, thus creating the possibility of a plurality of
independent legal orders.113 At the same time, monists usually claim
that customary international law has domestic effect without
domestic implementation.114 For their part, dualists frequently
108. See KELSEN, supra note 69, at 328-29, 333.
109. See BROWNLIE, supra note 93, at 32; Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist
Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 530 (1999); see also
Simma, supra note 107, at 44-47; Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend
Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 635
(2007).
110. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 111-12
(Bonnie Litchewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 1992) [hereinafter KELSEN,
PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY]; KELSEN, supra note 69, at 328; Kelsen, supra note 106; cf. 2
HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, Kelsen’s Pure Science of Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 404, 422 (E.
Lauterpacht ed., 1975) (“The very conception of co-ordination and equality logically
presupposes the existence of a higher authority establishing and realizing the relation of
equality [among national legal systems].”); Starke, supra note 71, at 74 (“Two normative
systems with binding force in the same field must form part of the same order.”). In a later
work Kelsen acknowledged the possibility of a conflict among norms. See HANS KELSEN,
Morality and Law, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 233, 233 (Peter Heath trans.,
1973). He never explains satisfactorily how norms in the same chain of validity can conflict. 
111. See, e.g., KELSEN, supra note 69.
112. See Kelsen, supra note 106, at 629.
113. See Starke, supra note 71, at 69-75.
114. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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maintain that customary international law is not self-executing.115
The different positions on self-execution might seem to follow from
different claims about the conditions of legal validity made by
monists and dualists.
This view about the relation of monism and dualism to the
question of the self-execution of customary international law is
mistaken. It conflates two different issues. Monism and dualism are
views about the relation of the international legal system to
domestic legal systems. They differ over the primacy that interna-
tional law rules have over domestic law rules. Monism maintains
that the norms of domestic legal systems in some way derive their
validity from those of international law, whereas dualism claims
that the validity of the norms of domestic legal systems are inde-
pendent of those of international legal systems.116 A different issue
is the priority of international law rules over those of domestic
law—that is, whether international law rules apply domestically
without domestic authority, regardless of how the norms of these
systems derive their validity. This question concerns the manner in
which international law is given effect domestically.
The difference between the validity of legal rules and their
priority means that domestic law rules can derive their validity
from international law while in some instances being prior to it.
Although it is often assumed that derived rules must be inferior to
the rules from which they originate,117 the assumption is unsound.
Derived rules can sometimes be superior to the rules from which
they derive. Kelsen, for instance, thought of derivation in terms of
the delegation of rule-making authority from a higher to a lower
level authority. For him, a lower-level rule is validly derived from
a higher-level rule when it is created in accordance with the latter
rule.118 If monism is correct, international law authorizes the enact-
115. See Margarita K. O’Donnell, New Dirty War Judgments in Argentina: National Courts
and Domestic Prosecutions of International Human Rights Violations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333,
339 (2009).
116. See H.L.A. HART, Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY 309, 320-21 (1983); J.G. STARKE, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (1965);
Kelsen, supra note 106, at 629.
117. See, e.g., NEIL MACCORMICK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY 105 (1999) (“The idea of [the
European Community Law] being constitutionally dependent on the member states or any one
of them is at the very least put in question by the claim of ‘primacy’ or ‘supremacy.’”). 
118. See KELSEN, PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY, supra note 110, at 63-64.
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ment of domestic law rules. At the same time, international law
might not consider its own rules to be self-executing. According to
international law, without domestic recognition, its rules have no
domestic application.119 In this case, although domestic law derives
from international law, domestic law takes precedence over inter-
national law. 
For example, customary international law obligates a party to a
treaty to comply with the treaty’s terms. Suppose a state is a party
to a treaty that has domestic application. Suppose, too, that the
state’s properly enacted legislation prohibits its enforcement do-
mestically and that the treaty is not otherwise incorporated into
domestic law. Although the state violates international law and
remains obligated under the treaty, international law does not
consider the treaty to have domestic effect. This situation is fairly
described as one in which international law gives domestic law
priority over its own rules.
Self-execution can be a norm of a single international and do-
mestic legal order (monism) or a separate domestic legal order
(dualism). Because the rule that determines whether international
law is self-executing can be part of either sort of legal order, the
unified character of the legal order is independent of the rule. For
instance, as an analogy, the United States is a single legal order.
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution makes
federal law supreme over inconsistent state law.120 Similarly, in the
European Union community, its law is supreme over inconsistent
national law.121 Consequently, federal law applies in states supple-
menting and displacing state law inconsistent with it. The fact that
the United States is a single legal order does not prevent federal law
from being self-executing.
A single legal order could contain a rule to the effect that inter-
national law does not have domestic effect unless incorporated into
domestic law. For instance, Article VI’s Supremacy Clause could
have been different. It could have made state law supreme over
federal law, displacing it when the two conflicted. Alternatively, the
Clause could have stated a last-in-time rule, giving supremacy to
119. For an explanation of the relationship between domestic and international law, see
J.G. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 71-94 (10th ed. 1989).
120. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
121. See Case C-6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, ¶ 3.
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state or federal law according to the time of its enactment or judicial
recognition. This alternative rule mimics the priority rule between
treaties and federal legislation.122 These possibilities show that a
single legal order can include a rule against self-execution. 
Thus, the debate over whether distinct legal orders form a unified
legal system has nothing to do with the way in which a rule applies
within these orders. Whether the rule is self-executing within a
legal system depends on the manner in which it applies there, not
merely on the fact that it is part of a unified legal order. For this
reason, if customary international law is self-executing, a rule in the
relevant legal system allows for self-execution. The unitary char-
acter of the legal system by itself does not require it, nor does self-
execution dictate the relation of international law to domestic law.
Views that connect the place of international law in a legal order
with its self-execution confuse the question of international law’s
primacy in justification with its priority over domestic law.
To be sure, if the validity of a state’s legal norms do not derive
from the validity of those of international law, monism is wrong,
and domestic and international law are not part of the same legal
system.123 In that case, an international law rule providing for or
against self-execution has no domestic legal effect without domestic
recognition. But even if monism is correct, international law rules
still might not have domestic effect, because the single legal system
does not itself provide that its rules are effective domestically
without domestic implementation. This requires a further step.
True, working monists tend to assume that rules of customary
international law are self-executing. Judge Lauterpacht’s statement
in the Case of Certain Norwegian Loans is representative:
The question of conformity of national legislation with interna-
tional law is a matter of international law. The notion that if a
122. See Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and
Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 325 (2005).
123. Kelsen’s monism only requires that state and international legal rules be part of a
single chain of validity. See, e.g., KELSEN, supra note 69, at 333-39. His theory therefore
acknowledges that international legal rules can be derived from those of states. Some monists
require that a state’s legal rules be derived from rules of international law. See 1
LAUTERPACHT, supra note 106, at 152. For a position that allows European Union law and
member states’ laws to be derived from international law although not being derived from
each other, see MACCORMICK, supra note 117, at 117-18.
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matter is governed by national law it is for that reason at the
same time outside the sphere of international law is both novel
and, if accepted, subversive of international law. It is not enough
for a State to bring a matter under the protective umbrella of its
legislation, possibly of a predatory character, in order to shelter
it effectively from any control by international law.124
Lauterpacht does not explain why international law, even as part
of a single legal system, has priority over inconsistent state law.
Monism does not by itself require that customary international law
“control” domestic law. This is a matter of the content of the cus-
tomary international law, just as Article VI’s Supremacy Clause is
part of the content of the Constitution. For this reason, positions on
monism and dualism cannot always decide whether customary
international law is self-executing. 
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT ABOUT CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The conditions under which a custom exists, the custom’s inter-
pretation, and its normative force all bear on the character of
customs among states.125 However, these are matters that bear on
customs generally. They do not help answer the specific questions
courts and other legal authorities have to answer about customary
international law: its content, the legal obligations it creates, and its
domestic law effect. The following questions should be asked: Which
customs are part of customary international law? What obligations
do they impose on states? And are those norms part of domestic
law? Questions asking whether there are norms of customary inter-
national law, or whether customary international law is law, are far
less appropriate. Jurisprudential theses about law, legal validity,
and the relation between customary international law and domestic
law do not help answer these legal questions. They either have
nothing to say about the questions or are not needed to give legally
acceptable answers to them. Whether international law is self-
124. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 37 (July 6) (Lauterpacht, J.,
concurring).
125. See Frederick Schauer, Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary Law, in THE
NATURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW 13, 33 (Amanda Perreau-Saussine & James Bernard Murphy
eds., 2007).
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executing cannot be determined a priori based just on the relation-
ship between international and domestic law. Similarly, legal rules
can limit the authority of courts to rely on customary international
law, regardless of the correct conception of law. Jurisprudence is
irrelevant to both matters.
Jurisprudential theses about law, legal validity, and the unity of
legal systems make conceptual claims. They describe features that
norms or systems necessarily must have to be legal in character. By
contrast, the answers to the questions usually raised by customary
international law depend on facts about state practices and legal
systems. They turn on contingent features of custom and legal
systems, including international law. This is obviously true with
respect to the content of customary international law. Custom
creates norms that obligate members of a community; the obligation
does not require recognition by a legal system. Because the norms
arise from regularity in behavior among a critical mass in the
community, their content depends on this regularity. Custom varies
according to the behavior supporting it and so has no necessary
content. The norms of customary international law, as custom, can
and do vary over time.126
For the same reason, custom has no necessary priority over other
norms. While customary law, unlike simple custom, creates legal
obligations, those obligations may not be superior to other legal
obligations. Whether customary law operates only at the state level
or also domestically can depend on the content of the particular
custom. Although customary international law does not require
recognition by a domestic legal system to create legal obligations,
these obligations need not have priority over domestic law or
automatic effect domestically. There is nothing in the bare notion of
customary international law that gives it priority over inconsistent
domestic law or makes customary international law applicable in
domestic law without domestic implementation. The mere fact that
international and domestic law are part of the same or different
legal orders does not by itself give international law priority over
domestic law or make it self-executing. Put another way, even if
126. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW 172-73 (2010); cf. Brian Tierney,
Vitoria and Suarez on Ius Gentium, Natural Law, and Custom, in THE NATURE OF
CUSTOMARY LAW, supra note 125, at 101, 103-04 (discussing the rule of law of nations
permitting enslavement of captives).
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customary international law and domestic law are parts of a single
legal order, international law might give priority to domestic law
over customary international law, or domestic law might give
priority to customary international law over domestic law. The
priority or effect of customary international law depends on
particular facts: facts about the priority or effect international law
gives it. This is a contingent matter.
Finally, if customary international law is not self-executing, so
that its domestic application requires incorporation into domestic
law, domestic law controls the recognition of customary interna-
tional law. Erie’s limit on federal judicial law making extends to
customary international law, requiring a source of authority in
federal or state law for its application. Customary international law
might be federal law for purposes of the Supremacy Clause in
Article VI of the Constitution. Alternatively, its recognition might
be authorized by legislation.127 In both cases, the limits on the
judicial recognition of customary international law are constitu-
tional or statutory, not jurisprudential.
CONCLUSION
Jurisprudence does not inform legal argument about the author-
ity of customary international law, its status as law, or its priority
over inconsistent domestic law. Conceptual views about law, legal
authority, or the identity of a legal system do not limit the legal
materials, admissible inferences from them, doctrine, or the stan-
dards of proof that figure in reasoning about customary interna-
tional law and its application. Fairly understood, Erie requires
congressional, executive, or state legislative authorization for cus-
tomary international law to have domestic effect, and the basis of
the requirement is constitutional not conceptual. Constitutional
requirements, not views about legal authority, therefore determine
customary international law’s domestic legal effect. For the same
reason, conceptions of law such as positivism do not dictate the
domestic status or application of customary international law. Nor
127. See, e.g., Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692, 714 (2004) (granting judicial authority to create a federal cause of action under the
Alien Tort Statute in a narrow range of circumstances).
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do notions of a legal system compel any conclusion about the
priority of international law over domestic law when they conflict.
In each case jurisprudence does not help answer the questions
courts and other legal authorities ask about customary interna-
tional law.
